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(Ref.. E&A 1/2  reviewi  by  Edward 
Johnson  of  THE  CASE  OF  THE  ANIMALSI  
vs.. MAN  BEFORE  THE  KINGI  OF  THE  JINN) 
Edward  Johnson  finds  one  argumentr t ini  
Singer'si '  ANIMALI  LIBERATIONI I  wherer  II 
foundf  two.t . Johnson  subordinatesi t  thet  
claiml i  thatt t animals'i l ' unlearnedl r  desiresi  
arer  frustratefr tr t  ini  factoryf t r  farming,f r i , tot  
thet  themet  off suffering,ff ri , makingi  hedonismis  
thet  solel  basisi  off Singer'si r'  claims.l i s. 
Thisis seemss s a  narrowingrr i  off Singer'si r'  
focus,f c s, asas isi  suggesteds este  by  thet e mentione ti  
off unlearnedlear e  desires:sir s: ifif sufferings ff ri  
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isi  involvedi l e  ini  frustrationfr str ti  off aiiii 
desires,sir s, thet e factf t thatt t thet e desiressir s ini  
questionsti  arer  unlearnedlear e  isi  irrelevant.irr l t. 
The mentionti  off thet  innatenessi t  off 
desiresir  seemss s tot  mee tot  appeall tot  anothert r 
(albeit( l it related)r l t ) standardt r  off valuel  
beyond thet  pleasure/painl / i  calculus,l l , 
namelyl  naturalness.t l . Singer'si '  argument,r t, 
whichi  is highlyi l  rhetorical,t i l, appealsl  
explicitlyli itl  and connotativelyt ti l  tot  thet  
idea of naturalness frequently; for 
example,l , when he contrasts the bucolic 
folk imagei  of the farm with its 
mechanized, artificial reality, con­
trasts the IIrelatively natural condi­
tions of the traditional farms llll with 
II rel 
the IIstress of modern intensive farming II"st ,1II ' the IIsmallal  independent farmers llll with 
plants"the IIfactory like ll of IIAgri­
business, II etc. 
When Singer writes that lIevery natural 
instinct the birds have is frustrated," 
I find it rather hard to confine the 
impact of his words to the claim that 
the birds are frustrated soleiy in ways 
that cause suffering. To me there 
seems to be an implication as well 
that wrong has been done because nature 
is not allowed to run in its own course. 
 
Similarly, when veal calves are called 
lIunhealthy and unhappy"-the meaning 
is not  simply  that  the  calves  are  in  pain  
but  they  do not  frolic  and flourish  
robustly  as  calves  in  "relatively  
natural"  settings  might  do.  Again  
nature  is  frustrate-over  and  above  
the  questions  of  pain  and early  death.  
I  find  this  perennial  line  of  argument  
interesting  and  not  obViously 
lIunhealt Y
v fallacious  
in  any  formal  way but  certainly  subject  
to  a  definite  sort  of  abuse  if  one  
attempts  to  formalize  it  by  formulating  
categorically  the  premisesi  from  whichi  
such  a  conclusion  mighti t be  drawn.. Its  
tendency,t , as  II wrote,t , is  romantic.r ti . 
Mr.r. Johnson  has  apparentlytl  studiedt i  some  or  
all  off THE  CASE  OF  THE  ANIMALSI  vs.. MAN  
BEFORE  THE  KINGI  OF  THE  JINNJI  and  locatedl t  
one  off thet  centraltr l ideasi  II elicitedli it  
fromfr  myy experienceri  withit  translatingtr l ti  
thatt t thousand-yeart s - r oldl  Arabicr i  text,t t, 
thet e ideai  thatt t "every"e er  animala i al speciess i s 
anda  ini  aa wayay everye er  animala i al individuali i i l isi  
 I 
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an end in itself (despite the fact 
that none is a moral subject or in a 
human sense a conscious subject) through 
existential claims to virtual subject­
hood. By virtual subjecthood I refer 
to the possibility of human subjects' 
projecting themselves into any crea­
ture's position." (p. 16) I regret 
that Johnson placed an ellipsis where 
I mention existential claims, suggesting 
that my foundation for animal deserts 
is subjective rather than ontological 
and recognizable by (age old but here 
newly analyzed) projective (and 
rhetorical) devices. I have been 
pursuing the idea of virtual subject­
hood as a foundation for the recogni­
tion of what I call a general theory 
of deserts (one which applies to all 
beings) in several of my recent phil­
osophical studies. Whether other 
philosophers shall find such avenues 
worth exploring in old or new recensions 
is, I think, a matter best left up to 
them. 
L. E. Goodman 
University of Hawaii 
-.-------­
(Ref. E&A 1/1 review by Robert
 
Greenwood of PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION)
 
Robert Greenwood is entirely correct
 
in pointing out that the brief dis­

cussion of the problem of evil in my
 
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION does not cover
 
the issue of animal pain. Further,
 
I agree with him that any thorough
 
treatment of the subject must take
 
account of the sufferings of other
 
forms of life than our own. I have,
 
however, written about this at some
 
length in Chapter 14 of my EVIL AND
 
THE GOD OF LOVE (2nd edition, Harper
 
and Row, 1978), and would refer the
 
interested reader to this.
 
John Hick 
Claremont Graduate 
SClle>oJ 
(Ref. E&A 1/3&4 review by Peter Singer 
of COMPASSION IS THE BUGLER- The 
Struggle for Animal Rights) 
As Peter Singer states in his review of 
my book, COMPASSION IS THE BUGLER, 
am an Animal Welfare administrator 
and not a philosophers and I endeavoured 
to write a straightforward account of 
two national campaigns in Britain 
which have been responsible for changing 
the whole face of the Animal Welfare 
Movement in this country. 
Whether that change will be for the 
good remains to be seen. Singer 
states that Animal Welfare Year and 
the campaign to "Put Animals Into 
Politics" have not yet yielded any 
change in the laws relating to the 
treatment of animals in Britain. In 
this he is correct, but there can be 
no doubt that changes in the law 
will be made during the lifetime of 
this Parliament, certainly in the 
areas of animal experi~ntation,
the welfare of farm animals and the 
protection of wildlife. 
This is the dilemma now facing us 
and the root cause for the present 
disunity in the Animal Welfare 
Kovement. For the past hundred 
and fifty years the Movement has 
been saying--"Abolish Vivisection 
and more recently, stop factory farming 
and ban blood sports". It is 
comparatively easy to campaign and gain 
public support when you are saying 
"stop it it is wrong". We now have 
to face the consequences of our own 
success since, with legislation 
pending in many areas which will not 
abolish Vivisection or stop factory 
farming or ban blood sports, the 
Animal Welfare Societies have to decide, 
do they intend to undertake the more 
difficult task of trying to achieve 
reform within the limits of how far 
the Government is prepared to go or, 
do they turn their back on such 
efforts and continue to seek the 
millennium. 
History will record which of us are 
following the right path for the 
animal.s. we all _SI.erve•. _ 
Clive Hollands 
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Ref. E&A 11/1 review by Robert 
Greenwood of "Animal Pain", Chapter 
4 of PROVIDENCE AND EVIL) 
The 'contradiction' that Greenwood 
finds in my book PROVIDENCE AND EVIL 
is a problem inseparable from the tra­
ditional belief that the Son of God 
is God and man, and that what is predi­
cable of Christ as man differs from 
what is predicable of him as God: 
e.g., as man he suffered pain and died, 
as God he neither suffered pain nor 
died. Whether this is a real contra­
diction obviously cannot be discussed 
here; no special point arises, anyhow, 
about the special pain of the compassion 
Christ may have felt as a man for the 
suffering of animals. further­It is 
more part of the same traditional theology, 
which I defend, to hold that the Divine 
Nature as such excludes any sort of 
suffering, and thus that God the 
Father, who was never incarnate, 
never would suffer pains of sympathy 
or any other pains. As for whether 
the living world is designed to avoid 
or even minimize the sufferings of the 
lower animals, I must submit that all 
the appearances are against this 
supposition: maintenance of it looks 
like wishful thinking. 
I am surprised that a review in ETHICS 
AND ANIMALS should actually not cite 
what I say about how hmnan beings, 
rather than their Maker, ought to 
treat animals (pp. 103-106 of my 
book) . 
P. T. Geach 
University of Leeds 
(Ref. E&A 1/1, review by Bart 
Gruzalski of "The Moral Basis of 
Vegetarianism") 
I have two comments on Bart Gruzalski's 
review of my critique of vegetarianism. 
(1) Gruzalski argues that I misapply 
utilitarianism, in that I fail to take 
into account animal emotion. Obviously, 
animals are capable of experiencing 
some emotions, such as fear. That 
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they are unable to feel others, such as 
sorrow at the passing of a social world, 
is equally plain. The precise issue 
is the weight to be given the impover­
ished conceptual structure of animal 
experience, and the rich conceptual 
structure of human experience, in 
attempting to determine whether vege­
tarianism is mandated from a utilitarian 
point of view••The pleasures of taste 
are not the only human enjoyment involved 
in meat-eating. nor an unsatisfied 
craving for such pleasures the only 
pain involved in its renunciation. 
Utilitarianism is here showing an 
important ambiguity, arising from its 
assimilation of all pains and pleasures 
to the simple paradigms of headache 
and orgasm. To maintain his credibility, 
a utilitarian must be prepared to take 
every variety of sorrow and delight 
into account, while to work his 
calculus he must treat all forms 
of experience as homogeneous, and 
reduce their attractive and unattrac­
tive features to the simple categories 
of intensity, purity, and duration. 
The result of this argument turns out 
to be the rejection of utilitarianism 
as a moral system rather than support 
for one or another of its applications, 
but in playing utilitarian I am as 
entitled to exploit the complexities 
of suffering and enjoyment as lived 
experiences as Gruzalski is to insist 
on the homogenous portrayal of these 
experiences necessary to the working 
of a Benthamite calculus. 
(2) Gruzalski complains that I overlook 
the difference between using human 
language and being a human speciesist. 
My argument was that words such as pain, 
fear, and grief have as their primary 
referents human experiences, and that 
their reference to nonhuman experiences 
takes place byway of analogy. Some 
nonhumans are enough like human beings 
to permit the employment of such words 
to their experiences, and chimpanzees 
may be enough like human beings to 
require the application to them of 
some of the moral principles we apply 
to human beings. But there is no 
on, and to wax and wane with, the 
animal in question's resemblance to 
The word " i· ttl a human being. spec es~S
 
is question-begging in this context.
 
Philip E. Devine 
Harvard Law School and 
University of Scranton 
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reason for suspicion when the applica­
tion of a word in our psychological and 
normative vocabulary turns out to depend 
EB /  
r  f r SUsp1c1on  t  a plica-
ti  f  r  i  r l ical and 
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